DeVito v. Clear Fork Valley Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2022-Ohio-3894

The Fifth Appellate District upheld the termination of a principal accused of, among other things, misconduct related to her evaluation duties. The principal allegedly asked a teacher to sign a blank document, recorded inaccurate observation/walkthrough times on six occasions, and copied/cut out signatures and stapled them into other documents.

The referee appointed to the termination appeal agreed with the Board on almost all specifications given for the termination.  The Board adopted the referee’s 237-page report, but also expressed disagreement with the specifications the referee did not uphold, citing its interpretation of the relevant facts found by the referee and applying them to its own policies. As such, the Board voted in favor of termination.

The principal appealed to the court of common pleas, which upheld the Board’s decision. On appeal, the principal raised a plethora of defenses the trial court allegedly ignored and errors that it made. Many were hyper-technical defenses related to due process and some were just seemingly made out of thin air. While on the one hand, this is eye-roll inducing for the reader (and the defense attorney), on the other hand, this gave the appellate court the opportunity to make some definitive statements about the law in this arena, which is always helpful.

First, the Plaintiff tried to argue that there were procedural defects, such as the failure to issue a twenty-one-day notice of the hearing, the treasurer failing to sign the notice informing the plaintiff that the Board would consider her termination, and that the referee and the Board both departed from the specifications for termination originally provided by the Board.

The court rejected these arguments essentially on the basis that there was no harm caused by minor procedural defects. It held that the hearing scheduling requirements are merely directory and not mandatory or jurisdictional.  With regard to the treasurer’s signature, the court found that the notice contained a typed signature line containing the treasurer’s name, thereby giving appellant the identity of the treasurer and informing her that the letter came from the treasurer’s office.  The notice was in substantial compliance with the law and was therefore sufficient.

 As to the minor deviations between the referee’s findings and the Board’s specifications for termination, the court noted that the very cases cited by the principal all reject a rigid standard of matching a Board’s specification of grounds with identical grounds for termination found by the referee. Rather, Ohio appellate courts have allowed the Board’s evidence to stand as long as the totality of the circumstances indicate that the teacher was sufficiently apprised of the issue in question to present countervailing evidence if so inclined.

The principal also attempted to attack the merits of the Board’s decision on even more ridiculous grounds than her procedural defenses and the court was predictably unassuaged. It went sort of like this:

Principal: The Board had to give me a chance to change my conduct before they could terminate me!

Court: No, they did not.

Principal: The Board had to consider my employment record before terminating me!

Court: No, they did not.

Principal: They didn’t read the transcript! The Board had to read the entire transcript of the hearing before making its final decision!

Court: No, they did not. The Board only had to consider the referee’s report in making its final decision. The trial court did, however, have to read the transcript, and concluded that the transcript showed you deserved to be terminated.

What does this mean for my District?

We should always of course be careful to meet all procedural requirements of the applicable law and CBA. But if you forget to put the letter in the mailbox with your left hand while blinking twice, the court is not going to hold that against you so long as the employee has sufficient information to assert their rights and prepare a defense.

Another facet of the ongoing fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic is the litigation that has ensued, particularly in employment law. Last month, there was progress in two cases stemming from the pandemic. The first involves the non-teaching employee employment statute, RC 3319.081, which requires that all non-teaching employees be “paid for all time lost when the schools in which they are employed are closed owing to an epidemic or other public calamity.” Prior to the pandemic, this generally only came up during snow days and other school closures. The second case is at the university level but involves one of the first causes of action under RC 3792.04, a statute enacted in 2021 which prohibits public schools and state institutions of higher education from discriminating against persons based on their vaccination status.

State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emps. v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist., 2022-Ohio-4242
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals has overturned an injunction that prohibited a reduction in force during the pandemic.
During the 2020-2021 school year, a School Board transitioned to remote instruction due to the pandemic. Buildings remained open for teachers, administrators, secretaries, and certain special education students. On November 19, 2020, the Board voted to implement a reduction in force of certain non-teaching employees.

The trial court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the Union. In its order, the trial court determined the following with regard to the statutory language: COVID-19 is “an epidemic or other public calamity”; the laid-off employees are “employed,” despite the reduction in force; and even though students are being taught remotely, the schools are “closed” because the employees cannot report to the buildings to perform their duties. The trial court also concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter because the rights asserted under R.C. 3319.081(G) are independent from the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.

Unfortunately, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals did not answer the questions of whether a reduction in force ends an employee’s eligibility to be paid wages for all time lost from a school closure, and whether a school building providing only remote instruction but which is still open to teachers, administrators, secretaries and special education students, is “closed.” The Appellate Court avoided those questions because the case was reversed on jurisdictional grounds. The Court found that the employees’ rights regarding reduction in force were governed by the collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement has a grievance process that is ultimately resolved through binding arbitration rather than litigation. The Court recognized that even though an employee may have rights provided by a statute (e.g. 3319.081 and 3319.17), if the application of the statute is dependent on an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, a court lacks jurisdiction over the case and it must be resolved through the grievance and arbitration process.

Siliko v. Miami Univ., 2022-Ohio-4133.
In this case, the Plaintiffs were employees that sued Miami University for claims alleging that the University’s vaccination policy violated the Ohio Constitution (“All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety”), as well as RC 2905.12 (Coercion); 3709.212 (a 2021 statute limiting the applicability of certain health department regulations related to disease prevention); 3792.04(B)(1) (requiring a vaccine); and 3792.04(B)(2) (discrimination on the basis of vaccination status).

Miami’s vaccination policy provided that all employees and students must be fully vaccinated by November 22, 2021, unless exempted. Requests for exemption were required to be submitted by October 15, 2021. Faculty, staff and students were also required to receive at least their first COVID-19 vaccine dose by October 25, 2021. The policy further provided that “exemptions may be granted for medical reasons, sincerely held religious beliefs or reasons of conscience (philosophical or ethical reason) and a deferral granted for pregnancy or nursing.” Individuals with an approved exemption were required to comply with COVID-19 testing and other educational and preventative health and safety measures. As for employees, the policy provided that “employees who choose not to be vaccinated and who do not receive an approved exemption will face disciplinary action.”

The trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint after finding that they lacked standing to challenge Miami University’s vaccination policy because, at the time of filing the complaint, they either had obtained an exemption to the vaccine requirement or had failed to request an exemption. The Appellate Court agreed with the dismissal except as to the discrimination claims under RC 3792.04(B)(2). The Plaintiffs alleged that because the policy required exempted employees to take additional measures such as testing and other prevention, they were being treated differently than similarly situated vaccinated employees in violation of the statute. Additionally, the Plaintiffs alleged that the University had a bonus program to encourage vaccination, which only vaccinated employees were eligible for.

The Appellate Court found that this was enough to survive a motion to dismiss and reinstated that portion of the case. It should be noted that a motion to dismiss is a high standard and serves to test the sufficiency of the complaint to state an actionable claim. It is not a judgment on the merits. Ennis Britton will monitor this case as it proceeds and will provide important updates to our clients.